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In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive proce-
dures for deﬁning a social group. The ﬁrst procedure starts with the
set of all individuals who deﬁne themselves as members of the social
group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all
individuals who are deﬁned by everyone in the society as group mem-
bers. Both procedures expand these initial sets by adding individuals
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1who are considered to be appropriate group members by someone in
the corresponding initial set, and continue inductively until there is
no possibility of expansion any more. Journal of Economic Literature
Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of group identiﬁcation serves as a background in many social
and economic contexts. For example, when one examines the political princi-
p l eo fs e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o no fan e w l yf o r m e dc o u n t r y ,o n ew o u l dl i k et od e ﬁne
the extension of a given nationality. Or when a newly arrived person in
Atlanta chooses where to live, the person is interested in ﬁnding out a res-
idential neighborhood that would suit her: “Are they my kind of people?
Do I belong to this neighborhood?” In all those contexts, it is typically as-
sumed that there is a well-deﬁned group of people who share some common
values, beliefs, expectations, customs, jargon, or rituals. Consequently, the
questions like “how to deﬁne a social group” or “who belongs to the social
group” arise.
In a recent paper, Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) provide an answer to
the above questions from a social choice perspective. They view that each
individual of a society has an opinion about every individual, including one-
self, whether the latter is a member of a group to be formed. The collective
identity of the group to be formed is then determined by aggregating opinions
of all the individuals in the society. For this purpose, they provide, among
others, an axiomatic characterization of a “liberal” aggregator whereby the
group consists of those and only those individuals who each of them views
oneself a member of the group.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the study of the group identiﬁcation
problem by adding a procedural view in the analysis. This procedural view
allows us to see a collective as “a family of groups, subcollectives, each with
its own view of who is a member of the collective, its own sense of tradition
and its own underlying conceptual realm, but each bearing some resemblance
to the other ones” (Kasher (1993, p. 70)). More speciﬁcally, we axiomatically
characterize two recursive procedures for determining “who is a member of a
social group”: a liberal-start-respecting procedure which extends the “liberal”
aggregator characterized by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), and a consensus-
2start-respecting procedure which is the one introduced by Kasher (1993).
The structure of both procedures consists of two components: an initial
set of individuals and a rule according to which new individuals are added to
this initial set. As the names of the procedures suggest, the initial set of the
ﬁrst procedure consists of all individuals who deﬁne themselves as members
of the social group, while the initial set of the second procedure collects all
individuals who are deﬁned as group members by everyone in the society.
The extension rule for both procedures is the same: only those individuals
who are considered to be appropriate group members by someone in the
corresponding initial set are added. The application of this rule continues
inductively until there is no possibility of expansion any more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the basic notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 introduces the axioms used for
characterization of the procedures. The main results are contained in Section
4, and Section 5 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Basic Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of all individuals in the society. The set
of all subsets of N is denoted by P(N). Each individual i ∈ N forms a set
Gi ⊆ N consisting of all society members that in the view of i have the
social identity G.F o r a l l i ∈ N,w h e ni ∈ Gi,w ea l s os a yt h a ti considers
himself as a G.Aproﬁle of views is an n-tuple of vectors G =( G1,...,G n)
where Gi ⊆ N for all i ∈ N.L e t G be the set of all proﬁles of views, i.e.
G =( P (N))
n.ACollective Identity Function (CIF) F : G → P (N) assigns
to each proﬁle G ∈ G as e tF(G) ⊆ N of socially accepted group members.
Let F be the set of all collective identity functions.
For any G ∈ G,d e ﬁne L0(G)={i ∈ N : i ∈ Gi}.T h u s ,L0(G) consists
of all individuals in the society who consider themselves as Gs. For any
G ∈ G, with the help of L0(G),w en o wd e ﬁne a CIF being liberal-start-
respecting,t ob ed e n o t e db yL(G), as follows: for each positive integer t,l e t
Lt(G)=Lt−1 (G) ∪ {i ∈ N : i ∈ Gk for some k ∈ Lt−1(G)};a n di ff o rs o m e
t ≥ 0, Lt(G)=Lt+1(G),t h e nL(G)=Lt(G).
For any G ∈ G,d e ﬁne now K0(G)={i ∈ N : i ∈ Gk for all k ∈ N}.T h u s ,
K0(G) consists of all individuals who are considered to be Gsb ye v e r y o n e
in the society. For any G ∈ G,w ed e ﬁne a CIF being consensus-start-
respecting, to be denoted by K(G), as follows: for each positive integer t,l e t
3Kt(G)=Kt−1 (G) ∪ {i ∈ N : i ∈ Gk for some k ∈ Kt−1(G)}; and if for some
t ≥ 0, Kt(G)=Kt+1(G),t h e nK(G)=Kt(G).
To illustrate the above procedures for deﬁning collectively accepted group
members, consider the following example. Let N = {1,2,3} and consider
the proﬁle G =( G1,G 2,G 3) with G1 = {1,2},G 2 = {2,3} and G3 = {2}.
Then, for this proﬁle, L0 = {1,2}, L1 = L0 ∪ {3} = {1,2,3}, L2 = L1.
Therefore, for the given proﬁle of views, and as a result of the application
of the liberal-start-respecting procedure we have L = {1,2,3}. For the same
proﬁle G of individual views we have K0 = {2}, K1 = K0 ∪ {3} = {2,3},
K2 = K1. Therefore, the collectively accepted group members according to
the consensus-start-respecting procedure are collected in the set K = {2,3}.
The procedure L deﬁned above is discussed in Kasher and Rubinstein
(1997). For each G ∈ G,i ts t a r t sw i t hL0 (G) which consists of all members
of the society who view themselves as Gs. Thus, the set L0 (G) reﬂects a
weak notion of self-determination: if one considers oneself a member of G,
then one should be a member of G collectively1. In contrast, for each G ∈ G,
the procedure K starts with K0 (G) which consists of all individuals who are
viewed by everyone in the society N as group members. Kasher (1993) calls
K0 the “incontrovertible core” of a collective to be deﬁned and he considers
it as initial approximation to an appropriate deﬁnition of the group identity.
An “improved approximation” includes also the possibility of extending
the above deﬁned initial sets via an extension rule. For each G ∈ G,t h e
CIF L (resp., K) now expands the set L0 (G) (resp., K0 (G))a sf o l l o w s .I f ,
according to some individual i ∈ L0(G) (resp., i ∈ K0 (G)) an individual
k ∈ N is viewed as a G,t h e nk should be a G collectively. By adding
all such kst oL0 (G) (resp., to K0 (G)), we obtain the set L1(G) (resp.,
K1(G)). We then repeat the above process with L1 (G) (resp., with K1 (G))
by adding those individuals who are considered as Gs by some individuals in
L1(G) (resp., in K1 (G))t oL1(G) (resp., to K1 (G))t oo b t a i nL2(G) (resp.,
K2 (G)). Since n is ﬁnite, at a certain step t,w em u s th a v eLt(G)=Lt+1(G)
(resp., Kt(G)=Kt+1(G)), i.e. the set Lt(G) (resp., Kt (G))c a nn ol o n g e r
be expanded. The intuition behind each step of the expansion is in line with
Kasher’s argument (1993): every socially accepted G as being newly added
brings a possibly unique new view of being a G collectively with him, and
a collective identity function is supposed to aggregate those views and must
pay attention to this new individual’s G-concept in order to cover the whole
1In Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), the individuals in L0 are called liberals.
4diversity of views in the society about the question “what does it mean to
be a G?”.
3A x i o m s
In order to present our axiomatic characterizations of the collective identity
functions L and K we introduce the following axioms for a CIF to satisfy.
AC I FF ∈ F satisﬁes
Consensus (C) iﬀ, for all G ∈ G, [j ∈ Gi for all i ∈ N] ⇒ j ∈ F(G),a n d
[j/ ∈ Gi for all i ∈ N] ⇒ j/ ∈ F(G).
Independence (I) iﬀ,f o ra l lp r o ﬁles G,G0 ∈ G,a n da l li ∈ N,i f[ f o re v e r y
k 6= i, k ∈ F (G) iﬀ k ∈ F(G0)], and [for all k ∈ N, i ∈ Gk iﬀ i ∈ G0
k],
then i ∈ F(G) iﬀ i ∈ F(G0).
Monotonicity (M) iﬀ, for all G,G0 ∈ G and all N1 ⊆ N such that [for all
l ∈ N, G0
l = Gl or G0
l = Gl − N0 where N0 ⊆ N1], if N1 ∩ F(G)=∅,
then N1 ∩ F(G0)=∅.
Symmetry (SYM) iﬀ, for all G ∈ G, for all j,k ∈ N,i f( i )∀i ∈ N − {j,k},
j ∈ Gi iﬀ k ∈ Gi; (ii) j ∈ Gj iﬀ k ∈ Gk; (iii) j ∈ Gk iﬀ k ∈ Gj,t h e n
j ∈ F(G) ⇔ k ∈ F(G).
Weak Liberalism I (WL(1)) iﬀ, for all G ∈ G,i fi ∈ Gi for some i ∈ N,t h e n
F(G) 6= ∅, and if there are disjoint subsets N1 and N2 of N such that
N1 ∪ N2 = N and N2 6= ∅, [Gi ⊆ N1 for all i ∈ N1 and i 6∈ Gi for all
i ∈ N2],t h e nF(G) 6= N.
Weak Liberalism II (WL(2)) iﬀ, for all G ∈ G,i fi 6∈ Gi for all i ∈ N,
then F(G) 6= N, and if there are disjoint subsets N1 and N2 of N such
that N1 ∪ N2 = N, N1 6= ∅, N2 6= ∅, [Gi ⊆ N1 for all i ∈ N1],t h e n
F(G) 6= N.
Extended Liberalism (EL) iﬀ,f o ra l lG ∈ G and for all k ∈ N,i f[k ∈ Gi for
some i ∈ F(G)] and [i 6= k],t h e nF(G) 6= {i}.
Equal Treatment of Insiders’ Views (ETIV) iﬀ, for all G,G0 ∈ G,a n da l l
i,k,m ∈ N,i f[ Gh = G0
h for all h ∈ N − {i,k}], [m ∈ Gk and m 6∈
5Gi], [G0
k = Gk − {m}], and [G0
i = Gi ∪ {m}], then [k ∈ F(G) and
i ∈ F(G0)] ⇒ [m ∈ F(G) iﬀ m ∈ F(G0)].
Equal Treatment of Outsider’s Views (ETOV) iﬀ, for all G,G0 ∈ G,a n da l l
i,k,m ∈ N,i f[Gh = G0
h for all h ∈ N − {i,k}, m ∈ (Gi ∩ G0
k),a n d
m 6∈ (Gk ∪ G0
i),t h e n[{i,k} ∩ F(G)=∅] ⇒ F(G)=F(G0).
Consensus and Independence are introduced and discussed in Kasher and
Rubinstein (1997). Monotonicity, which is a stronger version of a monotonic-
ity property introduced in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), requires that, if, for
ag i v e np r o ﬁle G, none of the individuals in N1 ⊆ N are regarded as members
of a social group, then, by changing G to another proﬁle G0 in which each
individual’s views regarding the individuals outside N1 do not change, while
possibly some individuals in N1 are no longer considered as group members
by each individual, none of the individuals in N1 continue to be regarded as
members of the social group. A similar monotonicity property is introduced
in Samet and Schmeidler (forthcoming).
Symmetry is a slightly stronger version of the axiom Symmetry used
by Kasher and Rubinstein. Weak Liberalism I and Weak Liberalism II are
weaker versions of the axiom Liberalism introduced in Kasher and Rubin-
stein (1997), while Extended Liberalism requires that if, according to an
individual i, an individual k 6= i is a group member, and, if i is regarded as a
group member collectively, then the set of group members consists of other
individuals than i.
Equal Treatment of Insiders’ Views requires that if an individual m is
considered to be an appropriate group member by an individual k , m ∈ Gk in
ag i v e np r o ﬁle, and if in a new proﬁle k does not consider m as an appropriate
group member anymore but a third individual i does, and nothing else has
changed, then, when k is a G collectively in the original proﬁle and i is a
G collectively in the new proﬁl e ,i tm u s tb et r u et h a tm is a G collectively
in the original proﬁle if and only if m is a G collectively in the new proﬁle.
This axiom essentially requires that a CIF should treat the views of all the
members who are considered to be Gs collectively equally.
Finally, Equal Treatment of Outsider’s Views basically says that a CIF
should treat the views of all the members who are considered to be non-
Gs collectively equally. This axiom is in the spirit of the exclusive self-
determination axiom introduced in Samet and Schmeidler (forthcoming).
64 Characterizations
In this section, we give axiomatic characterizations of a CIF being L and of
aC I Fb e i n gK as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 .
Theorem 1 A CIF F ∈ F satisﬁe st h ea x i o m s( C ) ,( M ) ,( I ) ,( S Y M ) ,
(WL(1)) and (ETIV) if and only if F = L.
Proof. It can be veriﬁed that the CIF L ∈ F satisﬁes the axioms (C), (M),
(I), (SYM), (WL(1)) and (ETIV). Let F be a CIF satisfying the six axioms.
We show that for all G ∈ G,
(i) L(G) ⊆ F(G),a n d
(ii) F(G)=L(G).
(i) In the following, in order to prove L(G) ⊆ F(G),w ep r o v eLt(G) ⊆
F(G) for all proﬁles G ∈ G by induction on t.
We ﬁrst show L0(G) ⊆ F(G) for all G ∈ G. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists a proﬁle G ∈ G such that i ∈ L0(G) but i 6∈ F(G) for some
i ∈ N. From the deﬁnition of L0,w eh a v ei ∈ Gi. Let us consider the proﬁle
G0 deﬁned as follows:




Gl − {i} if l 6= i,
Gl if l = i.
By (M), it follows that i 6∈ F(G0). Note that i ∈ L0 (G0). Consider the proﬁle
G00 deﬁned as follows:




{l} if l ∈ (F(G0) ∪ {i}),
∅ if l ∈ (N − {F(G0) ∪ {i}}).
By (C), j 6∈ F(G00) for all j ∈ (N − {F(G0) ∪ {i}}). By (SYM), either
F(G00)=F(G0) ∪ {i} or F(G00)=∅ is true to hold. Suppose F(G00)=
F(G0)∪{i}. Then, for all k ∈ N −{i}, k ∈ F (G00) iﬀ k ∈ F (G0).N o t et h a t ,
for all k ∈ N, i ∈ G00
k iﬀ i ∈ G0
k. Thus, by (I) and noting that i 6∈ F(G0),
we have i 6∈ F(G00), which contradicts F(G00)=F(G0) ∪ {i}.I t m u s t b e
true that F(G00)=∅. However, by (WL(1)), F(G00) 6= ∅,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Therefore, L0(G) ⊆ F(G) for all G ∈ G.
Next, we assume that Lt(G) ⊆ F(G) for all G ∈ G and show that
Lt+1(G) ⊆ F(G) for all G ∈ G. From the deﬁnition of L,i ti ss u ﬃcient
to show that i ∈ F(G) if i ∈ Gk for some k ∈ Lt(G).I f i ∈ Lt(G),t h e n
7we are done. Assume therefore i 6∈ Lt(G).N o t et h a t k ∈ F(G),w h i c hf o l -
lows from k ∈ Lt(G) and our assumption, and that i 6= k,w h i c hi sd u et o
i 6∈ Lt(G) and k ∈ Lt(G).L e tG0 ∈ G be a proﬁle deﬁned as follows:






Gl ∪ {i} if l = i,
Gl − {i} if l = k,
Gl if l ∈ (N − {i,k}).
From the deﬁnition of L0, i ∈ L0(G0).F r o mL0(G0) ⊆ F(G0),i tf o l l o w st h a t
i ∈ F(G0).N o t i n g t h a t k ∈ F(G) and i ∈ F(G0), by (ETIV), we obtain
i ∈ F(G).
Therefore, L(G) ⊆ F(G) for all G ∈ G.
(ii) We now show that L(G)=F(G) for all G ∈ G.L e tG ∈ G be given.
Consider the proﬁle G0 deﬁned as follows:




Gl if l ∈ L(G),
Gl ∪ (N − L(G)) − {l}) if l ∈ (N − L(G)).
Clearly, L(G)=L(G0).I f L(G)=N,f r o m( i ) ,L(G) ⊆ F(G). F(G)=
L(G)=N then follows easily. In the following, consider L(G) 6= N (and
therefore L(G0) 6= N). Noting that, from (i), L(G0) ⊆ F(G0), a straightfor-
ward application of (SYM) implies F(G0)=L(G0) or F(G0)=N.C o n s i d e r
N1 = L(G0) and N2 = N−L(G0). Noting that N2 6= ∅, G0
i ⊆ N1 for all i ∈ N1,
and i 6∈ G0
i for all i ∈ N2, by (WL(1)), it follows that F(G0) 6= N. Therefore,
F(G0)=L(G0). Note that the proﬁle G can be obtained by appropriately
deleting elements in N − L(G) from each G0
i,w h e r ei ∈ (N − L(G0)).S i n c e
i 6∈ F(G0) for all i ∈ (N − L(G)),b y( M ) ,w eo b t a i nF(G)=L(G).
Theorem 2 A CIF F ∈ F satisﬁes the axioms (C), (I), (M), (SYM),
(WL(2)), (EL) and (ETOV) if and only if F = K.
Proof. It can be veriﬁed that the CIF K ∈ F satisﬁes the axioms (C), (I),
(M), (SYM), (WL(2)), (EL) and (ETOV). Let F be a CIF satisfying the
seven axioms. We show that for all G ∈ G,
(i) K(G) ⊆ F(G),a n d
(ii) F(G)=K(G).
(i) In the following, in order to prove K(G) ⊆ F(G),w ep r o v eKt(G) ⊆
F(G) for all proﬁles G ∈ G by induction on t.
To begin with, we note that, for all G ∈ G,b y( C ) ,K0(G) ⊆ F(G).
When K0(G)=∅, Kt(G)=∅ for all t,a n dK(G) ⊆ F(G) follows easily.
8When K0(G)=N,b y( C ) ,F(G)=K0(G) (= K(G)) follows immediately.
Therefore, let K0(G) 6= ∅ and K0(G) 6= N for the subsequent proof.
Next, we show the following:
If Gj = {i} for all j ∈ N − {i} and i ∈ Gi,t h e nF(G)=Gi.( * )
If Gj = {i} for all j ∈ N,t h e n ,F(G)=Gi = {i} follows from (C)
directly. Let Gi 6= {i} and i ∈ Gi.B y( C ) ,i ∈ F(G).B y( E L ) ,F(G) 6= {i},
i.e., k ∈ F(G) for some k ∈ N with k 6= i.F r o m( C ) ,i tm u s tb et r u et h a ts u c h
a k ∈ F(G) belongs to Gi. By (SYM), it follows that for all l ∈ (Gi − {i}),
l ∈ F(G);t h a ti sF(G)=Gi.
We are ready to show that for if Kt(G) ⊆ F(G),t h e nKt+1(G) ⊆ F(G);
that is, we need to show that i ∈ F(G) if i ∈ Gk for some k ∈ Kt(G).I f
i ∈ Kt(G), then we are done. Assume therefore i 6∈ Kt(G). Suppose to the





Gl if l = k,
Gl − {i} otherwise.
By (M), it follows that i 6∈ F(G0).N o t e t h a t i ∈ Kt+1(G0)=Kt+1(G).





F(G0) ∪ {i} if l = k,
{k} otherwise.
Note that, by (*), F(G00)=F(G0) ∪ {i}; that is, for all l ∈ (N − {i}),
l ∈ F(G0) iﬀ l ∈ F(G00). Note further that for all l ∈ N, i ∈ G0
l iﬀ i ∈
G00
l .B y ( I ) , i ∈ F(G0) iﬀ i ∈ F(G00).B u t i ∈ F(G00) and i 6∈ F(G0),a
contradiction. Therefore, i ∈ F(G). Thus, we have shown that [Kt(G) ⊆
F(G)] ⇒ [Kt+1(G) ⊆ F(G)]. Therefore, K(G) ⊆ F(G).
(ii) We now show that F(G)=K(G) for all G ∈ G.L e tt h ep r o ﬁle G ∈ G
be given.
If K0(G)=∅ (so that K(G)=∅ as well), then for all h ∈ N, there exists
at least one l ∈ N such that h 6∈ Gl. Consider the following proﬁle G0:f o r
all h ∈ N, G0
h = N − {h}.B y ( S Y M ) , F(G0)=N or F(G0)=∅.F r o m
(WL(2)), noting that h 6∈ G0
h for all h ∈ N, we cannot have F(G0)=N.
Therefore, F(G0)=∅. Notice that there exists a G00 in which, for all h ∈ N,
Gh ⊆ G00
h and there exists exactly one l ∈ N such that h 6∈ G00
l . It follows
from (ETOV) that F(G00)=F(G0)=∅. By applying (M) with N1 = N,w e
have N ∩ F(G)=∅, i.e., F(G)=∅.H e n c e ,F(G)=∅ whenever K0(G)=∅.
9Next, consider K0(G) 6= ∅.F r o m ( i ) , w e m u s t h a v e K(G) ⊆ F(G0).I f
K(G)=N, K(G)=F(G) follows easily. Consider K(G) 6= N.L e tG0 be a
proﬁle deﬁned as follows:




Gl if l ∈ K(G),
Gl ∪ (N − K(G)) if l ∈ (N − K(G)).
Note that K(G0)=K(G). Suppose to the contrary that F(G0) 6= K(G0).
Then, given that K(G0) ⊆ F(G0),i tm u s tb et r u et h a tf o rs o m ej ∈ (N −
K(G0)), j ∈ F(G0). By (SYM), it follows that for all k ∈ (N − K(G)),k∈
F(G0). Hence, we must have F(G0)=N. On the other hand, consider
N1 = K(G) and N2 = N − K(G).N o t e t h a t G0
l ⊆ N1 for all l ∈ N1 and
N2 6= ∅.B y ( W L ( 2 ) ) , w e o b t a i n F(G0) 6= N, a contradiction. Therefore,
k 6∈ F(G0) for all k ∈ (N − K(G0)). Hence, K(G0)=F(G0). Note that
G0
l − Gl ⊆ (N − K(G)). From applying (M) with N1 = N − K(G),w eh a v e
F(G) ⊆ K(G). Noting that K(G) ⊆ F(G),t h e r e f o r e ,K(G)=F(G).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have axiomatically characterized the procedures that de-
ﬁne the collective identify functions L and K in the framework proposed by
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997). Though it is not our intention to advocate
these procedures, we note some interesting features of them. Note that the
procedure L starts with all those individuals who are “self-claimed” members
of a social group and then expands accordingly. Therefore, the procedure L
reﬂects a strong liberal view2 of collective identity. On the other hand, the
procedure K starts with all those individuals who are considered as group
members by everyone in the society and then expands accordingly. It there-
fore suggests that the procedure K is a “consensus-building” liberal view of
collective identity.
References
[1] A. Kasher, 1993. Jewish collective identity, in: D.T. Goldberg and M.
Krausz (eds.), Jewish Identity, Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
2See, for example, Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), and Samet and Schmeidler (forth-
coming). If the determination of the membership of a social group is a personal matter,
there is indeed some reason to call individuals in L0 as liberals (see Sen (1970)).
1056-78.
[2] A. Kasher and A. Rubinstein, 1997. On the Question “Who is a J?”: A
Social Choice Approach, Logique & Analyse 160 385-395.
[3] D. Samet and D. Schmeidler, Between Liberalism and Democracy, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
[4] A. K. Sen, 1970. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 78 152-157.
11